Predictions, precision, and agentive attention by Clark, Andy
	   1	  
 
Predictions, Precision, and Agentive Attention 
 
 
Forthcoming in Consciousness and Cognition 
 
 
Corresponding Author: 
 
Andy Clark 
School of Philosophy, Psychology, and Language Sciences 
University of Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh, UK 
EH12 5AY 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Ransom, Fazelpour, and Mole (this journal - 2017) raise an important puzzle 
for the ‘prediction error minimization’ account of cognitive processing. That 
account depicts all cognitive processing as fundamentally in the business of 
minimizing prediction errors concerning the evolving flow of sensory 
information. One of the cornerstones of these highly ambitious, would-be 
unifying accounts is their depiction of attention as nothing other than the process 
of optimizing the precision (inverse variance) of critical prediction error signals. 
But that story, Ransom et al suggest, cannot accommodate voluntary shifts of 
attention. In this paper, I show why this challenge to the grand unifying project 
fails.  It fails because it locates the origins of voluntary attention in complexes 
of unanalyzed desire rather than in changing complexes of beliefs.  
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1. A Model of Attention 
 
Cognition, it has recently been claimed, is always and everywhere a matter of 
minimizing prediction errors concerning the evolving flow of sensory 
information (Friston (2005, 2010), Hohwy (2013), Clark (2013a, 2016)). Such 
minimization occurs within a complex, multi-area, multi-level processing 
regime whose hierarchical structure reflects the operation of interacting and 
deeply nested environmental causes. But for all this to work, such systems need 
to be sensitive not simply to the presence of specific prediction errors, but to 
their state-dependent (context-variable) significance. Only by being thus 
sensitive can intelligent systems vary the impact of specific error signals 
according to their task-salience, reliability, or estimated value. This is the key 
role played by the so-called ‘precision-weighting’ of prediction error. Precision-
weighting reflects systemic estimates of the inverse variance of specific 
prediction error signals. More precise (lower variance) signals receive higher 
weighting, and are correspondingly positioned to exert greater influence over 
subsequent processing. In such cases variable precision weighting turns up the 
(post-synaptic) ‘volume’ on the selected signals.  
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Attention, as Ransom et al (2017) rightly stress, is then identified with this 
mechanism (which may have multiple implementations in the brain, operating 
in different ways and at different timescales – see Clark (2013b)). Most 
generally, it is claimed that “attention is simply the process of optimizing 
precision during hierarchical inference” (Friston (2009) p.299). Prediction 
errors are thus re-scaled, courtesy of recurrent connections and other devices, 
so as to increase or decrease their influence as task and context demand.  
 
The ability of precision variation to enforce decreased influence is especially 
important in cases of self-generated movement. Here the precision of 
information specifying the current state of the motor-effector system is 
attenuated, allowing top-down predicted states and trajectories to prevail. 
Precise prediction errors representing the difference between predicted and 
actual states are then minimized, bringing the motor plant into line with top-
down predictions. Effective motor control thus requires a kind of systematic 
dis-attention enabling motor activity to be guided by the agent’s intentions 
(Friston et al (2011), Adams et al (2013), Brown et al (2011), Brown, Adams et 
al (2013)).  
 
In sum, these stories depict attention and sensory attenuation as two sides of 
the same coin, mediated by augmenting and attenuating sensory precision 
respectively. Variable precision-weighting is thus revealed as a powerful control 
mechanism whose role goes far beyond the simple estimation of signal-to-noise. 
 
 
 
2. Attention Switching 
 
Ransom et al (2017) argue that this picture cannot do justice to the full range of 
ways in which attention is allocated. To demonstrate this, they focus upon the 
selective direction of attention, using Neisser and Becklen’s famous (1975) 
study as a key resource. In this study, subjects are exposed to two different 
films presented simultaneously in a single part of their visual field. This is an 
ecologically abnormal situation, supported experimentally by the use of half-
silvered mirrors which create an effect “that is something like the effect of 
looking out through the window of a lit room at dusk, when the exterior and 
reflected interior worlds are both visible in the same part of space.” (Ransom et 
al (2017) p.102). The superimposed films depicted different events, unfolding 
at different distances. But each film depicted the playing of a game – in one 
case a hand-clapping game, filmed up-close, and in the other case a ball game, 
filmed from a greater distance. Sometimes both film-streams were shown to 
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each eye, and at other times each eye received a single (but different) film-
stream. The results were that, when both scenes were shown to each eye, 
subjects had no trouble selectively attending to one stream, and could easily 
switch streams on demand. Attentive perception of both streams at once was, 
however, difficult or impossible. 
 
At first pass, nothing here is problematic for PEM.  At any given moment, a 
specific hypothesis (‘hand-clapping’ or ‘ball-game’) is used to meet the 
incoming sensory signal, and high-precision assigned to errors conditioned on 
that hypothesis. So we bring that sensory information into clear focus, while 
down-grading the precision on those aspects of the signal that would otherwise 
be recruiting the alternative hypothesis. There is no combined hypothesis that 
has any plausibility given prior learning, so we cannot attend to (assign high-
precision to errors concerning) both at once.  
 
The trouble – according to Ransom et al – comes when we try to explain why 
subjects find it so easy to switch between the streams. For the switch need be 
consequent upon no external cue. Subjects are able to flip between the streams 
‘at will’, without any change in the incoming signal or elsewhere in the 
sensorium. These easy flips of focus are not consequent upon any changes 
whatsoever in the incoming signals but are rather “directed by mental 
occurrences that are internal to the attentive perceiver” (op cit. p. 104). Those 
occurrences might be decisions, or emotion-led (perhaps we are bored with one 
stream), and so on. 
 
The core puzzle can now be brought into view. First, there is nothing in the 
external signal that marks out one stream of information as more reliable, 
valuable, or precise than the other. So there seems to be no external cue that 
could prompt the system to set the gain higher on one set of signals. Second, 
many of the thoughts that might prompt the flip have non-indicative contents. They 
are not about the way the world is, but might instead consist in something like 
the desire to look at the second stream. But it is not obvious (though more on 
this later) that non-indicative contents can alter precision-weightings, which are 
meant to track the reliability of signals rather than e.g. their desirability.  
Pushing this line of argument, Ransom et al note that “the precision of an 
incoming signal is a statistical feature of that signal, over some interval” (op cit 
p.106). The trouble, then, is that “the precisions in the world are equal” (op cit 
p.106, italics in original). 
 
3. The Real Puzzle –  Mental Action 
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Thus expressed, the puzzle may seem to have a simple solution. The solution is 
that although the incoming signals are in fact equally reliable and clear, the 
agent simply starts to treat one set as stronger or more reliable. Cast in PP 
terms, that means she starts to expect that signal to be stronger or more reliable, 
increases the gain on it, and thus brings about that very effect. Predictions of 
reliability/strength impact precision-weightings, bringing it about that one set 
are indeed stronger, clearer, better signals. This is because, by upping the gain 
on just the right aspects of the signal, that signal does in fact become better 
differentiated from background noise, hence (in the technical, ‘inverse variance’ 
sense) more precise. The situation, in the case at hand, would be roughly akin 
to having two radios, tuned to different channels, and turning up the volume 
on one of them. Increasing the estimated precision is like turning up the 
volume, and hence results in making that signal louder. The selective increase 
in precision thus becomes a kind of ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ – estimating 
greater precision brings greater precision about. 
 
Ransom et al consider this move, but reject it by arguing that (in the specific 
case at hand) it cannot explain the agent’s ability to shift her focus at will from 
one stream to the other. This, they argue, is because the self-fulfilling prophecy 
should now become locked in place, preventing the easy flips that are in fact 
observed. Insofar as the first estimate really does make it the case that the 
signals from one stream are more precise, that stream should continue to 
dominate.  
 
What is missing, it now seems clear, is a compelling account of the agentive (or 
as they put it, ‘voluntary’) re-allocation of precision. The worry that Ransom et al 
are pressing depends on the picture of precision as simply estimating signal 
reliability. If we artificially inflate the reliability estimate for stream one (say), we 
create a situation in which those signals are rendered more precise, enjoying 
greater post-synaptic impact. But this move, they argue, leaves us with no 
apparatus internal to the PP story capable of explaining how those precision 
estimations may endogenously alter. Even if we grant that precision estimations 
can act as a kind of ‘self fulfilling prophecy’, there is (so the worry goes) no 
story about why precision estimations alter in just those ways at just those 
moments (when voluntary attention shifts). In fact, it starts to look as if some 
kind of voluntary attentional shift must precede (and drive) the selection of the 
new materials to which the ‘self fulfilling prophecy trick’ then applies. 
 
The worry, in other words, is that we are left with no PP story about the top-
down distribution of attention itself. PP, if their argument is right, at best 
explains how endogenous attending is accomplished (by increasing precision) 
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but not how it is determined moment-by-moment, becoming allocated and re-
allocated as a result of decisions, motivations, and other mental actions. But an 
account of attention that does not encompass the top-down selectivity of 
attention is radically incomplete. More generally, the worry is that a PP model 
of cognition cannot accommodate mental actions and hence is severely 
incomplete. It is beyond the scope of this reply to address the full gamut of 
mental actions. But I think we can make progress, and begin to gesture at the 
shape of such a larger story, by looking harder at the kind of case that Ransom 
et al have here brought into clear focus. It is to this task that we next turn. 
 
 
4. Desires, Predictions, and Beliefs 
 
PEM claims that agentive attention consists in the allocation and re-allocation 
of precision, in ways that vary according to task and context. When external 
circumstances vary, precision estimations may vary accordingly. As the fog 
increases, the estimated precision of the visual signal goes down. Changes of 
task have the same kind of effect. If, looking at my desk, I want to find the key 
ring, the estimated precision of signal elements that would indicate a shiny, 
silver-colored object is increased. If I want to find a certain paper, the 
estimated precision for signal elements relevant to that paper (it’s look, size, or 
even title) increase. Indeed, there are fairly detailed accounts of the 
neurobiology that would mediate just this kind of top-down control over 
precision, for example in figure-ground segregation (Kanai et al 2015). 
 
On the face of it, the Neissser and Becklen study has exactly that form. To see 
the ball-game, increase precision on ball-game-y aspects of the overall signal. 
To see the hand-clapping game, increase the precision on hand-clappy stuff. 
The puzzle that Ransom et al pose does not bite here. Rather, it aims to cast 
doubt on PP’s capacity to explain how we recruit those shifts in precision 
estimation. They cannot be recruited by those changing estimates of precision, 
since they are those changing estimates of precision. They cannot be recruited 
by changing external cues, since the external cues have not changed. If the 
PEM account of attention is all about precision estimation, and precision 
estimation is all about reliability estimation, it is hard to see what further 
resources may be brought to bear from within the PEM story about attention 
itself. So PEM offers an incomplete account of endogenous selective attention. 
Intuitively, one wants to say that the altered precision estimations are 
consequent upon changing internal cues, and that these are indeed part and 
parcel of a PEM account of selective attention. I think this is broadly speaking 
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correct, but it needs careful unpacking to avoid the kinds of worry that Ransom 
et al are raising. 
 
It is important to notice that the PEM model of attention allocation (see also 
Hohwy (2013 pp 197-199)) is richer than the PEM model of the mechanism of 
attention. The mechanism of attention (of all stripes) is indeed the variability of 
precision-weighting in every neuronal area and at every level of processing. But 
what determines how that variability is used is the task at hand, and 
information concerning internal and external context. Internal context will 
include interoceptive information concerning e.g. physiological indicators of 
hunger and thirst. But it will also include the effects of standing beliefs (here 
cast as predictions) operating at multiple time-scales. It is these multi time-scale 
beliefs that must now be doing much of the work (in concert with internal and 
external cues) in accounting for endogenous shifts of attention. 
 
To bring this into focus, notice that these accounts make ‘beliefs’ (in the 
broadest sense) primary. This is already a common feature of many Bayesian 
accounts in which desired states of affairs are re-cast as beliefs that the desired 
state of affairs is observed, allowing inferential processes to uncover the ways 
to bring that state about (see e.g. Todorov (2009)). In the ‘active inference’ 
model, desires are simply beliefs/predictions that thus guide inference and 
action (see Friston et al (2011) p. 157). My desire to drink a glass of water now is 
cast as a prediction that I am drinking a glass of water now – a prediction that will 
yield streams of error signals that may be resolved by bringing the drinking 
about, thus making the world conform to my prediction. Desires are here re-
cast as predictions apt to be made true by action.  
 
Thus consider the prediction (based on some standing or newly emerging 
belief) that I will now experience, say, the hand-clapping film. This would 
enslave action, including the ‘mental action’ of altering the precision-weighting 
on hand-clappy stuff. In this way desires and motivations are revealed as  
beliefs that enslave action. The apparently non-indicative nature of a thought 
such as ‘let’s have a look at the hand-clap film’ is now no barrier. For the real 
content of the thought, as far as the PEM mechanism is concerned, is 
indicative – it is something like  ‘I am looking at the hand-clap film now’. This  
informs our expectations of precision, creating the kind of partially self-
fulfilling loop described earlier. High-level (initially false) predictions 
concerning which film is currently being viewed thus cause the precision re-
allocations that enable that very film to switch into awareness. 
 
5. The Bigger Picture 
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Ransom et al (p.110) do (very briefly) consider this kind of response. But they 
argue that such a move is inadequate, largely on the grounds of potential 
circularity. It is simply not clear, they suggest, how the move from desires to 
beliefs or policies can explain the occurrence or timing of voluntary shifts of 
attention. An ‘action policy’ that says ‘attend to what you want’, or  ‘attend to 
what you decide to attend to’ would, they note, do the job - but only at the cost 
of evident circularity. What is still missing, they claim, is a satisfying PEM story 
about the initiation of voluntary action including voluntary shifts of attention. 
 
This response fails to recognize the true scope of the formal demonstration 
that any set of behaviors prescribed by reward, cost, or utility functions can be 
prescribed by an apt set of systemic beliefs or priors (Friston (2011), Brown 
(1981), Friston et al (2012)). Given that result, it is clear enough that the 
behavioral profile associated with any set of desire or motivation-driven 
responses can be modeled as a set of responses driven by delicately interwoven 
webs of belief, driving predictions at many different time-scales.  
 
To be sure, the question could still be pressed: just where do these self-
predictions (that get to enslave action and mental action) come from? But this 
is clearly no worse than the parallel question: how do desires and motivations – 
such as a sudden desire to watch the other movie -  arise and act in the brain? 
Whatever account Ransom et al favour of the latter can simply be incorporated 
into the PEM treatment, translating desire/utility talk into belief/prediction 
talk, as rehearsed above. There is no circularity here. Whatever set of personal 
and environmental circumstances might conspire to install or suddenly 
foreground a desire (for example, the desire to attend to a different movie 
channel), those same circumstances are now called upon to install or suddenly 
foreground the behaviorally-equivalent belief. That belief-complex includes 
bespoke precision expectations that then become self-fulfilling in the standard 
PEM manner, bringing about the alterations in precision weighting that control 
the flow of information in the brain, thus favouring one movie over the other.  
 
To round this story off, notice that PEM already commands a potent 
mechanism capable of accounting for endogenously-driven change in systemic 
predictions. That mechanism is the joint (interoceptively and exteroceptively 
driven) minimization of prediction error (Pezzulo, Rigoli, and Friston (2015)). 
This ensures that complex organisms respond to an ever-changing internal 
milieu (potentially including some degree of random noise) in ways that 
dovetail with environmental opportunities. It is easy to see, for example, how 
an interoceptive prediction error signal created in response to a decrease in 
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blood glucose might combine with perceptual information to entrain an 
opportunistic  act of eating. Such an act, from the PEM perspective, is initiated 
not on the basis of a simple desire to eat, but on the basis of a standing belief 
that eating will occur when (for example) blood sugar levels are predicted to 
dip below a certain point. Once interoceptive information suggesting such a dip 
is received, there emerges a prediction (aimed at resolving that interoceptive 
prediction error) that eating now occurs.  
 
Importantly, this shows that precision should not be thought of simply as 
encoding the reliability of a signal, but also its estimated value (Friston et al 
(2012)). The link is firm since high precision predictions will exert greater 
control over action, corresponding (informally) to greater motivational salience 
(see Friston (2009) p.300). Value (including the ‘epistemic value’ of exploratory 
actions) thus emerges as the complement of surprise, to be maximized by 
action (Pezzulo et al (2015) p. 33). Shifting precision assignments also result 
from perceived opportunities to achieve a goal, where that means: the 
opportunity to make some standing or newly minted prediction come true, at 
this very moment, by engaging in apt action.  For an impressively 
comprehensive sketch of this PEM-based reconstruction of goal-directed 
behavior and motivational hierarchies, see Pezzulo et al (2015).  
 
In the context of a deep generative model, motivational flux thus emerges 
naturally as changing environmental opportunities interact with changing 
internal states, both spawning and responding to self-predictions spanning 
multiple temporal scales. These labile self-predictions play the role of shifting 
patterns of desire, and give rise to the changing precision weightings that 
implement voluntary attention. 
 
5. Conclusions: Broadening Precision 
 
Ransom et al’s careful critique helps reveal the pressing need to broaden our 
vision of precision estimation itself. For precision estimations must play 
multiple interlocking roles in a fully described PEM economy. Ransom et al 
focus mostly on one core role – that of tracking estimated reliability. They also 
allow that merely estimating a signal to have high-precision may sometimes 
create a positive feedback loop that helps bring that very state of affairs about 
(making a weak signal ‘jump out’ from the noise). But precision is adjusted (by 
multiple means) for every neuronal populations, and is thus entangled with 
many different kinds of information processing, including the ongoing 
interoceptively-informed estimation of both gross and epistemic value.  
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Within this evolving regime mental actions, such as voluntarily attending to one 
film rather than another, are indeed subtly special. Such mental actions are not 
the results of voluntarily altering our own precision estimations. Switches in 
what is attended cannot result from altering precision estimations because, just 
as Ransom et al argue, the switching consists in those very alterations. Instead, 
such mental actions are nothing other than the complex, allocations and re-
allocations of precision themselves. But these re-allocations are not thus 
rendered mysterious or beyond the remit of the PEM-story. For they are 
themselves determined by our standing beliefs, evolving inner states, and the 
play of perceived external opportunities. The ghost of unanalyzed desire is thus 
banished from the predictive machine, replaced by intentions in the form of 
prior beliefs.  
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